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REGULATING CORPORATIONS THE
AMERICAN WAY: WHY EXHAUSTIVE RULES
AND JUST DESERTS ARE THE MAINSTAY OF
U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
JONAS V. ANDERSON†
ABSTRACT
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, a flurry of media reports
revealed that pervasive corporate and accounting scandals were
infecting U.S. financial markets. As investors panicked and stock
prices plummeted, a determined Congress scrambled to restore order
by ushering in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the most exacting regulatory
imposition on corporate America since the Great Depression.
Burdened with the Act’s enormous administrative and transactional
costs, many corporations pulled their shares from U.S. markets and
relocated them to exchanges in nations with less onerous governance
strictures. This exodus has deeply concerned many U.S. political,
financial, and legal commentators, who argue that the American
corporate governance regime must be revamped to resemble the less
burdensome and principles-based soft law structure that operates in
countries like the United Kingdom. This Note assesses the viability of
such an overhaul. It ultimately concludes that given the longstanding
and singularly American predilection for rules-based regulation and
litigation, any large-scale transplant of soft law principles into U.S.
corporate governance is a practical impossibility.
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INTRODUCTION
By the end of August 2002, it was clear something was rotten in
the state of corporate America.1 In less than ten months’ time Enron
had collapsed,2 WorldCom had imploded,3 and federal investigators
had uncovered large-scale corporate and accounting imbroglios at
4
nineteen other major exchange-traded companies. As reports of
unprecedented malfeasance and fraud poured from media outlets at
an extraordinary rate,5 alarmed investors abandoned public securities
6
markets in droves.
An alarmed Congress was likewise quick to react, hastening to
draft the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002, commonly called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
7
after its principal legislative sponsors. With eleven titles and nearly
150 pages of text, Sarbanes-Oxley is replete with regulatory
prescriptions that compel public companies to beef up their internal
controls and overhaul their governance structures.8 It also directs the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft a vast body of

1. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1, sc. 4, l. 90 (Joseph
Quincy Adams ed., Riverside Press 1929).
2. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Collapses as Suitor Cancels Plans
for Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1.
3. See Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2002, at A1 (reporting that WorldCom, after once listing more than $107 billion in assets,
submitted the largest bankruptcy filing in United States history).
4. Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES, Aug. 26, 2002, http://www.
forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
5. See, e.g., Will Hutton, Bye Bye American Pie, THE OBSERVER (London), June 30, 2002,
at 25 (commenting that the United States was struck with “an orgy of unprecedented corporate
fraud, plunder and malfeasance that has demanded the connivance of its most reputable
accounting firms, business leaders and banks”); Gary Strauss, How Did Business Get So Darn
Dirty?, USA TODAY, June 12, 2002, at 1B (observing that although “[g]reed and corruption
have always lingered at the edges of Corporate America, . . . . the new millennium . . . ushered in
a wave of fraud, corporate malfeasance, investment scams, ethical lapses and conflicts of interest
unprecedented in scope”).
6. Editorial, Stock Market Blues, MIAMI HERALD, July 21, 2002, at 6L (“Spooked by
recent corporate scandals, investors have sent U.S. stocks tumbling into one of the worst market
dives in three decades.”).
7. John Paul Lucci, Enron—The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) (“[Sarbanes-Oxley]
became law a mere seven months after Enron filed for bankruptcy.”); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
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9
10
implementing rules that fill more than three thousand pages.
Collectively, these requirements—and the nearly $2 million in
operational costs and legal fees Sarbanes-Oxley annually imposes on
11
many companies —have led commentators to denounce it as the
most heavy-handed regulatory imposition on public corporations in
more than seventy years.12
An increasing number of corporations have therefore chosen to
take their business outside the United States, where regulatory
oversight is less stringent and compliance costs are less exorbitant.13
Their exodus has exacted a heavy toll on the once preeminent U.S.
capital markets, which have slipped behind Europe and Asia on key
14
indicators of economic vitality. Sarbanes-Oxley’s many critics have

9. See 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (Supp. V 2005) (“The [SEC] shall promulgate such rules and
regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of this Act.”).
10. Silvia Ascarelli, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: In Europe, Corporate-Governance Rules Are
Not in the Details, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R6 (“[W]hile the U.S. has turned to explicit
rules—3,000 pages written by the SEC to flesh out the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and still going—
many other countries have let industry lay out new guidelines and left enforcement to peer
pressure.”).
11. Adrian Michaels, Companies Balk at Cost of Compliance, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
12, 2004, at 25; see also What’s Wrong with Wall Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 11, 11
(“[Sarbanes-Oxley] greatly increased the reporting burden on companies.”).
12. E.g., Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54
MERCER L. REV. 731, 732 (2003) (inquiry of Michael Rosenzweig) (labeling Sarbanes-Oxley
“the most sweeping federal regulation of public corporations since the federal securities laws
were enacted some seventy years ago”); Justin O’Brien, The Politics of Symbolism: SarbanesOxley in Context, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 9,
9 (Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 2006) (observing that Sarbanes-Oxley has been both
heralded and denigrated “as the most far-reaching change to the governance of corporations
and the markets in which they operate since the 1930s”).
13. See Silvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C1 (discussing the increasing number of foreign corporations that are
delisting from U.S. stock markets and deregistering with the SEC to escape mounting SarbanesOxley compliance costs).
14. See, e.g., Down on the Street, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 69, 70 (reporting that the
New York Stock Exchange’s share of initial public offerings, as measured by proceeds, has been
surpassed by both London and Hong Kong).
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15
been quick to take notice and have called for a significant trimming
of its vast web of regulatory red tape.16
Even more importantly, a growing number of business
executives, political leaders, and legal observers view Sarbanes-Oxley
as part of a much larger problem, namely the entire rules-based
17
system of U.S. corporate governance. They advocate far-reaching
legislative and administrative measures18 that would strip the U.S.
regulatory regime of its rules-based structure, which they perceive as
hopelessly “complex,” “murky,” and “harder to understand and
harder to follow” than more flexible regimes in other nations.19 In its
place, they propose adopting a more principles-based approach,
similar to the regime operating in the United Kingdom under its

15. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1589 (2005) (criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley for creating
regulations that burden corporations with debilitating transaction costs that drive them out of
the United States); William A. Niskanen, Enron’s Last Victim: American Markets, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2007, at A21 (“[Sarbanes-Oxley] has proven counterproductive in the extreme. . . . [It]
has seriously harmed American corporations and financial markets without increasing investor
confidence . . . . [and has] created an expensive and arguably unconstitutional new regulatory
agency to regulate the audit firms’ activities.”); see also Ascarelli, supra note 10 (“The U.S.
emphasis on detailed rules has perplexed many European political and business leaders, who
criticize Sarbanes-Oxley as poorly written legislation drafted in haste.”); Special Report: The
Rules of the Game, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2007, at 16, 18 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley is “often
blamed for making America a less attractive place for doing business”).
16. See What’s Wrong with Wall Street, supra note 11, at 11 (observing that many critics
have argued that “America is also responsible for its financial markets’ decline by tangling them
up in red tape. Nowhere is this clearer than the Sarbanes-Oxley act . . . .”).
17. See COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
(2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission.com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm
(advocating “quick and decisive adjustments in the U.S. legal and regulatory framework”); Tom
Bawden, Bush Says Sarbanes Hurts US Markets, TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 2007, at 53 (discussing
President George W. Bush’s belief that overregulation of American capital markets has
damaged the U.S. economy); Jeremy Grant, Bernanke Calls for US to Follow UK’s “PrinciplesBased” Approach, FIN. TIMES (London), May 16, 2007, at 1 (reporting Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s concern that the rules-based system of regulation is no longer
suitable for American markets).
18. See MANSOOR DAILAMI, WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE VOLUME
I: REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND OUTLOOK 101 (2007) (“Recognizing the advantages of the
European approach [to corporate governance], in 2006 the U.S. Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation recommended a more principles-based approach to regulation to enhance
shareholder rights while reducing overly burdensome regulations and litigation.”).
19. Cary Coglianese et al., The Role of Government in Corporate Governance, N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS., Fall 2004, at 219, 229.
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20
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined Code). In
contrast to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Combined Code incorporates a set of
guiding principles—rather than copious lists of exhaustive rules—that
21
are designed to keep corporate abuses in check.
By highlighting specific differences in U.S. and U.K. regulation
of audit committee financial experts as a point of reference, this Note
examines the feasibility of exchanging the rules-based regime of U.S.
corporate governance for a principles-based replacement akin to the
Combined Code. Due to several dominant historical and cultural
threads woven deep into the fabric of a uniquely American legal
ethos, this Note concludes that any significant shift toward a more
principles-based regime would be short-lived.
Part I defines the scope of the problem, highlighting key
differences between the U.S. and U.K. regulatory systems and
describing the arguments of those who have called for dramatic
change to the U.S. system. Part II focuses more specifically on the
Combined Code and its theoretical and practical dissonance with the
U.S. scheme for regulating corporate governance. Particular emphasis
is given to essential differences in U.K. and U.S. enforcement and
ideology, as well as the differences in each nation’s regulation of audit
committees and financial experts. Part III illustrates the significant
roles U.S. history and culture have played in the cultivation of rulesbased regulation, including the roles they continue to play in
cementing its perpetuity. Finally, this Note concludes that these
cultural and historical forces are ultimately both too firmly fixed and
too transcendent to accommodate any large-scale adoption of
principles-based regulation into U.S. law. Indeed, even if such an
adoption were theoretically possible, a principles-based regime in the
United States would have no viable chance of long-term survival.

20. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006) [hereinafter COMBINED CODE], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/
corporate/combinedcode.cfm (follow the “Combined Code June 2006” hyperlink).
21. See BOB GARRATT, THIN ON TOP: WHY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS AND
HOW TO MEASURE AND IMPROVE BOARD PERFORMANCE 21 (2003) (asserting that any
“notion of there being a single, integrated Anglo/US governance model is untrue” because “US
and UK corporate governance practices are significantly different—especially in their approach
to compliance issues”).
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I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Comprehensive sets of prophylactic rules have long been the sine
qua non of U.S. corporate regulation. For reasons rooted partly in
U.S. social and economic history,22 congressional efforts to curtail
corporate fraud have customarily been marked by copious bright-line
tests, elaborate compilations of rules, multiple exceptions for each
rule, and a high level of regulatory detail23 intended to provide a clear
answer to every possible situation and to address all conceivable
24
eventualities.
For example, in the 1970s Congress countered the pervasive
foreign bribery and corporate political contribution scandals by
25
enacting the rules-saturated Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
26
To the dismay of many public company executives, the FCPA
mandated a costly overhaul of all corporate auditing programs,
including the implementation of a more rigorous system of internal
accounting controls.27 Similarly, in response to the shocking insider
trading scandals of the 1980s, Congress adopted the intricate and
28
“woefully . . . confusing” Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

22. See infra Part III; see also Coglianese et al., supra note 19, at 219 (“[M]uch of the
existing system of corporate regulation in the United States emerged in response to vagaries of
the late 1920s and the subsequent stock market crash.”); Jeremy Grant, Paulson Vows to Bolster
US Competitiveness, FT.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eb34ca58-d19f-11dbb921-000b5df10621.html (commenting that the U.S. “‘rules-based’ system [was] forged in the
post-Depression years of investor protection”).
23. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United States, in
AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION
IN EUROPE AND THE US 265, 271 (John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006); see
GARRATT, supra note 21, at 21 (stating that rules support the quintessentially U.S.
“emphasis . . . on external agencies ensuring compliance and, if necessary, litigation”).
24. Coglianese et al., supra note 19, at 229.
25. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR,
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 1 (1982) (“The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 has been characterized as the most extensive application of
federal law to the regulation of corporations since the passage of the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts.”).
26. Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a
Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 189 (1994) (“From the instant the [Foreign
Corrupt Practices] Act was implemented, American corporations complained about the Act’s
provisions and clamored for amendment.”).
27. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 144 (2006).
28. JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 65
(1991).
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29
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). Like Sarbanes-Oxley and the
FCPA, the ITSFEA has been criticized for both its severity and its
abstruse impenetrability.30
This approach is anathema to the regulatory approach in many
nations, including the United Kingdom. Following the failures at
Enron and WorldCom, the Financial Reporting Council,31 an
independent regulatory panel staffed with British corporate
luminaries, issued an important soft law32 document titled “The
33
Combined Code on Corporate Governance.” The Combined Code

29. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter “Exchange Act”] by adding §§ 21A(a)(3) and (b)(1)).
The insider trading scandals of the early 1980s led more immediately to Congress’ enactment of
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. James D. Cox, The Role of Empirical Evidence in
Evaluating the Wisdom of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006). The Act
“authorize[d] the SEC to impose a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profits made
or losses avoided by any person who violated the antifraud rules by inside trading or tipping.”
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, with the assistance of Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 745 n.25 (2003). However, the Act failed to
prevent two highly-publicized scandals in the mid-1980s involving, respectively, Dennis Levine
and Ivan Boesky. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Wages Even Wall St. Can’t Stomach, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 1989, at D1 (“Mr. Boesky, the envy of Wall Street in 1985, when he made an estimated
$100 million, paid that much to settle insider trading charges the following year.”); Nathanial C.
Nash, An Insider Scheme Is Put in Millions, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1986, at A1 (“A Wall Street
merger specialist [Dennis Levine . . .] was charged today with using confidential information
illegally in a trading scheme that reaped at least $12.6 million in profits . . . .”). In response to
these (and other) scandals, Congress quickly enacted more sweeping regulation with the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910,
at 7 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (“The [ITSFEA] represents the
response of this Committee to a series of revelations over the last two years concerning serious
episodes of abusive and illegal practices on Wall Street.”).
30. See Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the
1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 608 (observing that Congress passed ITSFEA after “fram[ing] insider
trading as an issue of immorality and punishment . . . of good versus evil,” which allowed it to
place excessive liability on defendants in a way that was draconian). Further, because the
ITSFEA “increased penalties for ‘insider trading’ without defining [insider trading]” itself, it has
drawn broad criticism for being incomplete and confusing. Id.
31. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK APPROACH TO CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 4 (2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate (follow “The UK
Approach to Corporate Governance” hyperlink). The Council declares that “[t]he UK’s system
of business regulation, which is principles rather than rules based, reduces the cost to global
businesses of introducing procedures to comply with detailed regulations, many of which
unnecessarily constrain business practice and innovation.” Id. at 1.
32. “‘[S]oft law[s,]’ [broadly defined, are] those regulatory instruments and mechanisms of
governance that, while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do not rely on binding
rules or on a regime of formal sanctions.” Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 499, 499 (2006).
33. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20.
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proposes a small number of recommended “best practices” and
34
compels companies wishing to list on the London Stock Exchange to
comply, or alternatively, to state their reasons for noncompliance in
35
their annual reports. If companies choose noncompliance, it is
assumed investors will either accept the noncompliance or pressure
those companies to conform—by voting their shares or by selling
36
their shares in the open market. Hence, the principles-based system
is essentially shareholder regulated.37
Principles-based regulation has drawn praise from many
influential U.S. political and business leaders who view the rulesbased system as a sort of millstone around the neck of U.S. capital
markets. For example, in January 2007, President George W. Bush
cautioned that legislative rulemaking had created “excessive litigation
and overregulation [that] threaten to make our capital markets less
attractive to investors, especially in the face of rising competition
38
from capital markets abroad.” Shortly thereafter, a bipartisan
commission established by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
recommended “quick and decisive adjustments in the U.S. legal and
regulatory framework,”39 including a shift to a more principles-based
system focused on “providing informal guidance to market
40
The
participants . . . that . . . do[es] not require rulemaking.”
commission gravely observed, “[I]t has become increasingly clear that
the United States lacks an overall vision for how its legal and
regulatory framework should respond to . . . new market
developments.”41 In May 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke urged that the U.S. turn away from its traditional rulesbased regulation and candidly advocated “a consistent, principles-

34. JEAN JACQUES DU PLESSIS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 306 (2005).
35. Id.; John Friedland, Reforming Disclosure and Corporate Governance in the UK:
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 1 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 35, 36 (2003).
36. Ascarelli, supra note 10.
37. See NEIL COWAN, RISK ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 99 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that the
United Kingdom’s enforcement is “market-led and driven by stakeholder groups who will
enforce good governance by ‘voting with their feet’ in respect of withdrawing financial support
from companies that do not follow the voluntary code”).
38. Bawden, supra note 17.
39. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 17, at 4.
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 11.
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based, and risk-focused approach” similar to the one used in the
42
United Kingdom.
Still, others have advocated caution in considering these calls for
change. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., has publicly
recommended an examination of “whether it would be practically
possible and beneficial to move toward a more principles-based
regulatory system,” given that rules-based regulation “has served [the
United States] very well over the course of [its] history. . . . [and] is
43
part of the foundation for [its] prosperity and growth.” Paulson’s
concern forms the basis for this Note, which investigates whether it is
practical and beneficial to adopt a more principles-based regulatory
framework into U.S. corporate governance.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Although U.S. and U.K. approaches to corporate regulation are
fundamentally different, they also share some areas of common
ground. This Part describes both their essential differences and their
similarities.
A. Essential Differences
Why is it unfeasible to adopt a principles-based regime of
corporate governance into U.S. law? There are at least two general
reasons. First, such an adoption is hampered by several key and
essential differences that distinguish the U.S. approach to corporate
governance from its U.K. counterpart. This Section discusses those
differences, which are—at their essence—differences in enforcement
and ideology. Second, as Part III discusses, a uniquely American
history and legal culture play a fundamental role in cementing the
preeminence of rules in U.S. corporate governance.

42. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Speech to
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2007 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Ga.
(May 15, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2007
0515a.htm.
43. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Opening Remarks at Treasury’s Capital
Markets Competitiveness Conference at Georgetown Univ. (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp306.htm.
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Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementing rules grant the SEC —and
45
arguably private citizens —authority to enforce the Act’s provisions
through litigation. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has no corporate
governance legislation whatsoever and therefore no comparable lever
to pry open the courthouse doors.46 Instead, the London Stock
Exchange—a self-regulatory organization—simply requires U.K.listed companies to comply with the Combined Code’s recommended
principles or to explain publicly why they do not comply.47 This public
reporting presumably allows investors themselves to promote
conscientious corporate governance by choosing to invest with those
companies that practice it and to pull their funds from those that do
not.48 This enforcement regime may punish corporate misdeeds in the
marketplace but it does not punish them in the courtroom.
A narrower enforcement distinction arises from the differing
degrees of auditor flexibility allowed by the governance structures of
each country. In the United States, Sarbanes-Oxley makes it unlawful
for an audit firm to engage in any of eight specific types of nonaudit
49
services contemporaneous with its audit of a public company. This
regulation is intended to safeguard the audit firm’s independence and

44. See 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (“The [SEC] shall promulgate such rules
and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate . . . in furtherance of this Act. . . . A
violation . . . [of] any rule or regulation of the [SEC] issued under this Act . . . shall be treated
for all purposes in the same manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”).
45. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Implied Private Actions Under SarbanesOxley, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 775, 776, 805 (2004) (contending that Sarbanes-Oxley “contains
a number of provisions expressly granting private parties the right to sue for violations of the
Act” and creates “additional duties and obligations . . . [that] provide fuel for new implied
private actions”). But see PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 105 (2003) (“There is no new private right of action for investors
created by Sarbanes-Oxley.”). MacAvoy and Millstein affirm however that Sarbanes-Oxley
“permit[s a] private right of action to recover profits improperly obtained by insiders during
pension fund black out periods” and requires “certain certifications . . . [that] could provide the
basis of a private action.” Id. at 105 n.20.
46. COWAN, supra note 37, at 98.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 99.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (Supp. V 2005) (listing these services as “(1) bookkeeping or
other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2)
financial information systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services,
fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or dealer,
investment adviser, or investment banking services; (8) legal services and expert services
unrelated to the audit”). Also prohibited are any services that the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, established by 15 U.S.C. § 7211, determines are impermissible. Id.
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preempt foreseeable conflicts of interest with the audited firm.
Unfortunately, it may also burden the audited firm with the
additional expense of hiring multiple companies to provide multiple
services. The auditing firm could likely provide the nonaudit services
less expensively than any of these other companies by virtue of the
understanding gained through its audit of the client.51
In the United Kingdom, the Auditing Practices Board (APB),
which is part of the Financial Reporting Council, is charged with
establishing auditing standards that instill confidence in the auditing
process.52 It has developed a more flexible approach to non-audit
activities than the eight Sarbanes-Oxley categories by issuing a form
of guidance called the “APB Ethical Standard: Non-Audit Services
Provided to Audit Clients.”53 Among other things, the “APB Ethical
Standard” suggests that if a lead auditor detects a possible or actual
breach of one of its provisions, that auditor should “assess the
implications of the breach, determine whether there are safeguards
that can be put in place or other actions that can be taken to address
any potential adverse consequences and consider whether there is a
need to resign from the audit engagement.”54 Authority for
enforcement thus rests with the auditor, not with an outside legal
55
entity.
The United States and the United Kingdom also approach
corporate governance from opposite ideological angles, as indicated
by official statements about the purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Combined Code respectively. Sarbanes-Oxley was expressly created
“[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of
50. Paul Davies, Enron and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK and the European
Community, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES
REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US, supra note 23, at 415, 432.
51. Id.
52. The Auditing Practices Board Home Page, http://www.frc.org.uk/apb/ (last visited Jan.
19, 2008).
53. AUDITING PRACTICES BD., APB ETHICAL STANDARD 5: NON-AUDIT SERVICES
PROVIDED TO AUDIT CLIENTS (2004), available at www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/
ES5vprint.pdf.
54. Id. para. 3.
55. The authority of APB pronouncements is slightly—but only slightly—more substantial
than is indicated here, as auditing firms in Britain must register with supervisory administrative
bodies and these bodies have been included to adopt APB standards and guidance as a
requirement for the firms registered with them. See AUDITING PRACTICES BD., THE AUDITING
PRACTICES BOARD–SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF PRONOUNCEMENTS (REVISED) para. 12
(2006), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded/documents/ (follow “The Auditing
Practices Board - Scope and Authority of Pronouncements _Revised_ 2006.pdf” hyperlink).

04__ANDERSON.DOC

1092

4/16/2008 8:35:11 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1081
56

corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.” The
legislative focus was explicitly on augmenting corporate reporting—
which simultaneously increases corporate transaction costs—to
restore investor confidence and to safeguard the integrity of U.S.
markets.57 This “rules and enforcement first” approach not only
“made the whole business of operating a company in the United
58
States a lot more tiresome,” it also made it much more expensive,
with Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs reportedly reaching
approximately $6 billion in 2006.59 Studies indicate that these forces
60
are driving securities issuers away from the United States.
61
Conversely, flexibility is the touchstone of the Combined Code
and the British have allowed the more fluid forces of the capital
markets to dictate the ways corporations choose to govern
themselves.62 The Combined Code’s stated purpose is to “enabl[e]
UK listed companies to be led in a way which facilitates
63
entrepreneurial success and the management of risk.” Important
emphasis is placed on “entrepreneurial success” and corporate
profitability, not on costly legal disclosures and protective

56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
57. Implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 35 (2003) (statement of William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). Sarbanes-Oxley’s principal
objectives “can be grouped into the following themes: [t]o strengthen and restore confidence in
the accounting profession; [t]o strengthen enforcement of the Federal securities laws; [t]o
improve the ‘tone at the top’ and executive responsibility; [t]o improve disclosure and financial
reporting; and [t]o improve the performance of ‘gatekeepers.’” Id.
58. James Harding, London Calling, TIMES ONLINE (London), Mar. 13, 2007, http://
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/columnists/article1503880.ece.
59. Deepak Gopinath, Why the Big Deals No Longer Call Wall Street Home, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 21, 2007, at B15.
60. Id.
61. See COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK para. 3.10 (2000) (observing that the
United Kingdom’s corporate system’s flexibility is a “great strength,” which is likely to prove a
major competitive advantage in the marketplace); PETRI MÄNTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS AS A RULE-MAKER 86 (2005) (stating that “UK
company law is regarded as flexible”); Andrew Hurst, London Keeps Edge Over Wall St. for
Now, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.reuters.com/article/InvestmentBanking06/idUSL168
2039720061116 (“Speakers at a Reuters Investment Banking Summit singled out for praise
Britain’s principles-based system of market regulation . . . .”).
62. Ascarelli, supra note 10.
63. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE COMBINED CODE
1 (2007), available at http://www.frrp.co.uk/press/pub1299.html (follow “Consultation Paper:
Review of the Impact of the Combined Code” hyperlink).
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mechanisms to safeguard investors. Some commentators believe that
this company-friendly focus has allowed London to surpass New
64
York as the world’s most vibrant economic center.
B. Audit Committees and Financial Experts
Despite these contrasting enforcement mechanisms and
ideologies, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code share certain
patches of common regulatory ground, especially with regard to
corporate audit committees. This Section describes the contours of
that common ground.
1. Audit Committees. Audit committees in both the United
States and the United Kingdom are generally structured in the same
fashion and serve the same functions. All committee members must
be independent non-executive directors.65 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the
audit committee is legally accountable for appointing, compensating,
and overseeing the work of the outside auditor.66 Under the
Combined Code, however, the committee “should . . . review and
monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the
effectiveness of the audit process,”67 but “no regulatory enforcement
68
proceeding or class action is prompted by non-compliance.” Indeed,
although corporations in the United Kingdom are directed by the
Combined Code to comply with its provisions or explain their reasons
for noncompliance,69 no legal penalties arise from their failure to
comply with or explain any of these provisions unless the corporation
is listed on a U.K. stock exchange. If a corporation is listed, and it

64. See Hurst, supra note 61 (“Britain’s flexible financial regulatory regime is giving
London a strong edge over New York, especially in attracting foreign company listings, and
there is no sign Wall Street can close the gap soon.”).
65. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (“Each member of the audit
committee . . . shall be a member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be
independent.”), with COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1 (“The board should establish an
audit committee of . . . members, who should all be independent non-executive directors.”).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2).
67. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.2 (emphasis added).
68. Thomas J. Dougherty, The Political Economy of Corporations: Varying Approaches to
Corporate Governance Around the World (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education Course of
Study, May 4–5, 2006), WL SL085 ALI-ABA 253, 256.
69. See COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, pmbl. at 1 (stating that “the company has either
to confirm that it complies with the Code’s provisions or—where it does not—to provide an
explanation”).
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fails to comply or explain, it may be subject to prosecution under the
70
U.K. Listing Authority.
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the audit
committee serves a policing role to ensure that those managing
71
corporate affairs comply with accepted accounting principles. This
safeguard gives shareholders and investors increased confidence in a
72
company’s reports about its financial health. Of course, at Enron,
WorldCom, and other large U.S. corporations that have folded,
breakdowns in the auditing process prevented shareholders from
obtaining such accurate information.73 Auditors at these firms did not
require strict management compliance with general accounting
standards because their interests were entwined with those of the
management.74 Under Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code,
members of a public company’s audit committee must be
independent, meaning their interests are dissociated from those of
corporate executives.75
2. Financial Expertise under the Combined Code. Although
both Sarbanes-Oxley and the Combined Code also seek to provide a
certain level of financial expertise on corporate audit committees,

70. Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, Comply or Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance
with the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 486, 488 n.11 (2006) (“[B]reach of the Listing
Rules . . . can be sanctioned by public censure, fine or suspension from listing under the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.”).
71. See JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: LAW
AND EXPLANATION 13 (2002) (stating that a goal is to “improve quality and transparency in
financial reporting by those companies”); Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the
Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 508 (2004)
(stating that “[a]uditors ensure that the management complies with accounting standards”).
72. Matthew M. Benov, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating
Foreign Private Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 439,
454–55 (2003) (“The United Kingdom drafted . . . the Combined Code . . . out of concern for
maintaining integrity in financial reporting and boosting investor confidence.” (citation
omitted)); Shirley, supra note 71, at 508.
73. See BROOKS CARDER & PATRICK RAGAN, MEASUREMENT MATTERS: HOW
EFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT DRIVES BUSINESS AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE 124 (2005) (“Audited
financial statements indicated that Enron, WorldCom, and Health South were making
substantial profits at a time when they were in fact losing large amounts of money.”).
74. ANDREW D. CROCKETT, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY: WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THEM? 36 (2003).
75. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (Supp. V 2005) (“Each member of the audit
committee of the issuer . . . shall otherwise be independent.”), with COMBINED CODE, supra
note 20, § C.3.1 (stating that the members of the audit committee “should all be independent
non-executive directors”).
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they approach this goal in different ways. The Combined Code
showcases its flexibility in regulating corporations, stating that “[t]he
board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit
76
committee has recent and relevant financial experience.” Thus, even
if the board decides to bring someone onto its audit committee whose
financial expertise is limited to balancing a personal checkbook, the
Combined Code only requires that the board feel satisfied that the
experience is both recent and relevant. No one else must be satisfied.
Under such a permissive standard, even if a corporation fails to put
anyone with a moderate amount of financial experience on its audit
committee, as long as it satisfies itself, no disclosure is required in the
annual report.
Moreover, shareholder discretion is the only policing mechanism
provided by the Combined Code. No government or industry
watchdog has authority to assess the extent of a financial expert’s
expertise. Indeed, even if a provision bestowed such authority on an
industry watchdog, it would have no objective standard for measuring
whether a board member’s financial expertise was sufficient. All the
Combined Code requires is that the corporation “satisfy itself.” This
implies that the corporation must satisfy not only its directors, but
also its owners—the shareholders—whom the Combined Code
envisions as the real watchdogs of corporation. Because all
shareholders have access to reports detailing the composition of the
company’s audit committee,77 the Combined Code anticipates that
these shareholders will regulate company behavior by either
pressuring corporations to appoint someone with bona fide financial
expertise to the audit committee or by moving their money
elsewhere.
3. Financial Expertise under the U.S. Regulations.
The
numerous requirements and regulations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley,
the SEC rules, and the mandatory listing requirements of the major
U.S. securities exchanges contrast sharply with the Combined Code’s
flexible, principles-based and shareholder-regulated model. Because
Sarbanes-Oxley directs SEC rulemaking with regard to audit
committee financial experts, Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules are

76. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1 (emphasis added).
77. Id. § A.1.2 (“The annual report should identify the chairman, the deputy chairman
(where there is one), the chief executive, the senior independent director and the chairmen and
members of the nomination, audit, and remuneration committees.”).
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discussed together in the next Section. A description of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ listing requirements for
financial experts follows.
a. Sarbanes-Oxley and Associated SEC Regulations. SarbanesOxley directs the SEC to enact rules defining the qualifications of an
78
“audit committee financial expert.” Sarbanes-Oxley also requires
each corporation to disclose in either its annual report or its annual
shareholder proxy statement whether any member of its audit
79
committee meets these qualifications. If a corporate audit committee
has no financial expert, the company must explain why.80 If it does
have an expert, the company must disclose the name of that expert.81
Although on their surface the Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC
provisions appear quite similar to the Combined Code provisions in
that they both require companies to comply or explain their reasons
for noncompliance, two key differences make the American rulebased scheme more onerous on the companies it regulates. First,
finding an audit committee member who meets the SEC’s high bar
for financial expertise82 is much more difficult than finding one who
meets the Combined Code’s simple “board should satisfy itself”
83
requirement. Although the SEC has broadened the definition of
financial expertise somewhat since its first draft, which would have
excluded even former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan

78. 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a) (Supp. V 2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2003). The SEC’s
elaborate definition spans seventy-five pages. Ascarelli, supra note 10.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a).
80. Adam O. Emmerich et al., Composition of the Audit Committee: Ensuring Members
Meet the New Independence and Financial Literacy Rules, 2 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE &
GOVERNANCE 67, 69 (2005).
81. Id.
82. The SEC’s corrected final rule implementing Sarbanes-Oxley section 407 requires that
a financial expert have (i) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements; (ii) experience applying such principles in connection with the accounting
for estimates, accruals, and reserves that are generally comparable to the estimates, accruals and
reserves used in the registrant’s financial statements; experience preparing or auditing financial
statements that present accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and
complexity of issues expected to be raised by the registrant’s financial statements; (iii)
experience with internal controls and the procedures for financial reporting; and (iv) an
understanding of audit committee functions. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release Nos. 33-8177, 34-47235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110
(Jan. 23, 2003).
83. COMBINED CODE, supra note 20, § C.3.1.
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and investing luminary Warren Buffett from qualifying as experts,
corporate chiefs continue to complain that recruiting qualified
financial experts is a time-consuming hassle accompanied by high
“explicit and implicit costs [that] arise in attracting and retaining such
experts.”85 The SEC’s rules are “strict enough that even a highly
competent person with a financial background might fail to qualify.”86
Given that most of the Fortune 500 companies have already recruited
qualified experts, a substantial part of the problem may be that the
limited pool of qualified talent is drying up.
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that each company must
disclose the name of its financial expert has created its own unique set
of problems. Many have questioned whether characterizing someone
on the audit committee as an “expert” will bestow on that individual a
higher standard of care than is assumed by other directors, thereby
exposing the expert to increased liability. The SEC has attempted to
assuage these anxieties by assuring financial experts that they are not
subject to any liability, duties, or obligations above those traditionally
assumed by other directors.87 The SEC even adopted a safe harbor to
shield audit committee financial experts from liabilities arising under
federal securities laws.88
This safe harbor however, provides no refuge from plaintiffs
filing suit under state securities laws, and such plaintiffs have already
enjoyed a significant measure of success. For example, in In re
Emerging
Communications,
Inc.,
Shareholders
Litigation,89
shareholders brought suit claiming the directors of the corporation
had breached their fiduciary duty in connection with a merger
negotiation.90 Because fiduciary duties are matters of state law and

84. Geoffrey Colvin, Sarbanes & Co. Can’t Want This, FORTUNE, Dec. 30, 2002, at 66, 66.
(“Based on the language in [Sarbanes-Oxley], Alan Greenspan would not qualify as a financial
expert. Warren Buffet apparently would not qualify either. The reason, essentially, is that
neither man has been an accountant, an auditor, or a CFO, though it’s hard to imagine either
man failing to lead an audit committee quite effectively.”).
85. Alan Reinstein, To the Rescue: The ACFE: Is it a Bird? A Plane? Alan Greenspan?,
RMA J., Oct. 2004, at 62.
86. Bradley P. Cost & Daniel M. Miller, Emerging Communications: Enhanced Director
Liability for Experts?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2005, at 26, available at http://
www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2005/January/26.pdf.
87. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745
(Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
90. Id. at *1.
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91
not federal law, the SEC safe harbor was inapposite. The Delaware
Chancery Court held one director to a higher standard of care than all
the other directors because he was a financial expert, having gained
92
specialized experience in both securities and the telecom industries.
This case has effectively put all other financial experts on notice that
state courts may interpret the fiduciary obligations of experts to be
greater than those of the other audit committee members.

b. NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Requirements. The listing
requirements of the NYSE and NASDAQ likewise offer corporations
less flexibility than the Combined Code, and in some respects they
are even more restrictive than Sarbanes-Oxley. To be listed on either
of these exchanges, a corporation must have a financial expert on its
audit committee. There is no exception to this rule.93 In other words,
the rule is not “comply or explain,” it is “comply or list elsewhere.”
All issuers who list on the NYSE must have an independent director
who serves on the audit committee as a financial expert, and the
expert must possess “accounting or related financial management
expertise.”94 A qualified financial expert must possess sufficient
expertise to understand the most complex finance and accounting
issues a company might encounter during the course of its business.95
Similarly, the NASDAQ listing rules require company audit
committees to have at least one member with “past employment
experience in finance or accounting, requisite professional
certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or
background” that elevates that individual to a level of financial
sophistication, such as experience as a chief executive officer or chief

91. See Cost & Miller, supra note 86 (“The safe harbor is meant to protect directors from
extra liability under the federal securities laws. However, it is state law that imposes fiduciary
duties upon directors . . . .”).
92. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., 2004 WL 1305745, at *40 (finding a financial expert
culpable because he “possessed a specialized financial expertise, and an ability to understand
ECM’s intrinsic value, that was unique to ECM board members”).
93. Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 68 (noting that although the New York Stock
Exchange does require at least one member of the committee to be financially literate, it also
permits a corporation to be listed on the exchange even without such a member if the “audit
committee member . . . become[s] financially literate within a reasonable period of time after
being appointed to the audit committee”).
94. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a), http://www.nyse.com/regulation/
listed/1182508124422.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
95. Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 68.
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96
financial officer. A company whose audit committee financial expert
qualifies under the SEC rules also qualifies for purposes of the
NASDAQ listing requirements.97
When juxtaposed against the principles-oriented Combined
Code, the NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules bring to light another
important ideological principle that distinguishes U.S. corporate
governance from its U.K. counterpart. Listing rules are essentially
protective intermediaries. They stand at the gateway of the major
exchanges to bar companies deemed most likely to harm investors.98
For the NYSE and NASDAQ, those companies that do not have a
qualified financial expert on their audit committee are barred from
issuing securities. Conversely, the Combined Code allows any issuer
to market its securities as long as it reports what is happening behind
closed doors. The state ultimately places trust in shareholders and
investors, who are empowered to look after their own interests, to do
their own research, and to make investment decisions without
intermediary gatekeepers.

III. UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES IN CONTEXT
The ultimate question this Note seeks to address, and the one
posed by many U.S. political and financial leaders, is whether it is
feasible to transplant into U.S. law a more principles-based regulatory
approach to corporate governance that is similar to and perhaps
patterned after the Combined Code. To understand whether such
dramatic changes in U.S. law are feasible—and if feasible, what they
would look like in a legal and political system that has long been
predominantly rules-based—it is useful to examine the genesis and
evolution of the U.S. regulatory framework. It is likewise useful to
assess the impact American culture has had and continues to have on
U.S. corporate regulation.

96. NASDAQ Manual Online, Marketplace Rule 4350(d)(2)(A), http://nasdaq.complinet.
com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 (last visited Jan. 27, 2008);
accord Emmerich et al., supra note 80, at 69.
97. NASDAQ Manual Online, Marketplace Rule IM-4350-4, http://nasdaq.complinet.com/
nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&element_id=1014 (follow the “IM-4350-4 Board
Independence and Independent Committees” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
98. See 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 22 (1981) (labeling
the listing requirements of the securities exchanges the “gatekeepers of the path along which
securities move to the public”).
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However, because “culture can mean so many things,” and is
100
susceptible to being “everywhere invoked and nowhere explained,”
it is first necessary to briefly define the meaning of “culture” used
here. Borrowing from “the dominant paradigm” of culture that has
emerged from cultural studies,101 this Note defines “culture” as “both
the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups
and classes, [based on] their given historical conditions and
relationships . . . and as the lived traditions and practices through
which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and . . . embodied.”102 As
Gunther Teubner points out, cultural differences between nations
complicate legal transfer and may lead to its failure, for “legal
transfer is not smooth and simple but has to be assimilated to the
deep structure of the new law, to the social world constructions that
are unique to the different legal culture.”103 This Note argues that the
uniquely American culture that has fostered rules-based corporate
governance will resist and spurn the adoption of a soft law, principlesbased regime to regulate corporate behavior.
This Part assesses the respective roles of both history and culture
in the formation and perpetuation of U.S. rules-based corporate
regulation. It then draws several comparative connections with the
development of the United Kingdom’s principles-based scheme.
A. Historical Influences
Early American colonists arrived in the New World feeling a
104
tremendous sense of distrust for corporate enterprise. Since early in
the eighteenth century, the English middle and lower classes had
been subject to widespread abuse and degradation at the hands of
profit-thirsty corporations that emerged during the Industrial

99. Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 35 (2001) (explaining that
culture can mean “collective identity, nation, race, corporate policy, civilization, arts and letters,
lifestyle, mass-produced popular artifacts, [and] ritual”).
100. Id.
101. Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms, in CULTURE/POWER/HISTORY: A
READER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 520, 527 (Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley &
Sherry B. Ortner eds., 1994) (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. (emphasis omitted).
103. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 19 (1998).
104. JOHN DAVID ROSE, RESCUING CAPITALISM FROM CORPORATISM: GREED AND THE
AMERICAN CORPORATE CULTURE 9 (2005).
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105
Revolution. Poor children were often delivered in batches of fifty to
one hundred to factory owners who whipped them, imprisoned them
in irons, and forced them to work up to eighteen hours a day.106
Even after arriving in the colonies, British settlers were
frequently exposed to the excesses of industrialist corporate greed.
The Crown routinely exploited the American colonies by making
them a nonconsenting market for English goods. It forced the
colonists to buy more than they were able to sell, thereby
exacerbating the deep recession and concomitant unemployment
crisis that already plagued the colonial economy.107 Bereft of any
means of stemming or regulating these inequities, the colonial
merchant, manufacturer, farmer, and planter were bonded together in
loathing British market manipulation.108
Thus, not surprisingly, the Founding Fathers viewed corporations
as dangerous organizations that, if not heavily regulated, would
109
threaten the very freedom of their fledgling nation. Fearing such a
threat, the original thirteen states adopted constitutional provisions
that placed strong restrictions on businesses, especially those with the
greatest potential to capture significant market, economic, and
110
political power. The Pennsylvania Legislature justified its heavy
regulation of industry, stating, “A corporation in law is just what the
incorporating act makes it. It is the creature of the law, and may be
moulded to any shape or for any . . . purpose that the Legislature may
deem most conducive to the general good.”111 Hence, from the early
days of the young republic, corporations were perceived with a
wariness that prompted and justified aggressive corporate regulation.
Such wariness and a consequent desire to check corporate
ambition are not isolated relics of colonial times long past. Near the
beginning of the twentieth century, even greater social acceptance of

105.
106.

Id.
2 MIRIAM BEARD, A HISTORY OF BUSINESS: FROM THE MONOPOLISTS TO THE
ORGANIZATION MAN 127 (1938).
107. HERBERT APTHEKER, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763–1783, at 34 (1960).
108. Id. at 34–35.
109. ROSE, supra note 104, at 9.
110. Id.
111. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA UPON THE SUBJECT
OF THE COAL TRADE 46 (1834).
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112
broad regulations of corporate affairs emerged in the United States
following the failure of the Reading Railroad and the subsequent
failures of hundreds of banks.113 These sudden and calamitous
economic disasters “shifted the psyche of the American public”
toward an even greater distrust of corporate behemoths in a way that
would continue to drive twentieth-century policy and lawmaking
114
decades later. In 1927, Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., proclaimed a sentiment representative of his era, stating,
“[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest and has
been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to
beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers.”115
Several years later, after plummeting stock prices on Wall Street
had signaled the onset of the Great Depression, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and the U.S. Congress completely reshaped the
federal government’s role in the U.S. economy by introducing the
116
New Deal. Historian Ronald Edsforth observes, “At the heart of
the New Deal reform program was a liberal commitment to make
federally guaranteed economic security a political right for every
American citizen.”117 It was envisioned that this security would be
permanently established through the creation of a broad series of
regulatory programs and agencies, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission.118 Because many of these programs and
agencies continue to play a prominent role in the twenty-first
century’s American corporate governance regime, political leaders

112. CRANE BRINTON, II A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 239 (1984) (“By the early twentieth
century public opinion was ready for increased participation by the national government in the
regulation of economic life.”).
113. Frederic S. Mishkin, Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical
Perspective, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 69, 86 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed.,
1991); Lee I. Niedringhaus, The Panic of 1893, FIN. HIST., Winter 1998, at 16, 19.
114. Niedringhaus, supra note 113, at 19.
115. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. RONALD EDSFORTH, THE NEW DEAL: AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 1 (2000) (“‘The New Deal’ is what [Franklin Delano Roosevelt], the press, and
everyone else in the country called the laws Congress began enacting just days after FDR took
office in the first week of March 1933.”).
117. Id. at 2.
118. See generally Edwin C. Rozwenc, THE NEW DEAL: REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION, at v
(1949), reprinted in 8–10 PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (Earl Latham, George Rogers
Taylor & George F. Whicher eds., 1959) (“The Roosevelt New Deal was a period of
unparalleled legislative activity . . . [marked] by an unprecedented multiplication of
administrative rules and regulations.”).
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calling for a more principles-based approach have condemned that
regime as an antiquated relic, rooted in a New Deal era that was
closer in time to the Civil War than to the corporate scandals that
119
fueled the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Nevertheless, from a purely historical perspective, it appears that
the greatest economic harm done to U.S. issuers, shareholders, and
investors actually resulted from the government’s surrender of
portions of its regulatory power in the days since the New Deal, not
from its continued imposition of onerous rules-based regulations on
corporations. For example, in 1983—a half-century after the New
Deal was instituted—banking institutions successfully lobbied for the
abrogation of certain government regulations, including restrictions
120
This
blocking their entry into stock brokerage activities.
deregulation was heralded as a grand leap forward for business and
investors until just three years later, in 1986, when it led to the
greatest collapse of U.S. financial institutions since the Great
Depression.121 From 1986 to 1995, 1,043 savings and loan institutions,
122
with combined holdings of over $500 billion, failed. The cost of
resolving this crisis eventually surpassed $190 billion, most of which
was paid for by taxpayers.123 In this instance, deregulation only
catalyzed economic growth for a short period before it contributed to
a devastating economic collapse.
Still, the savings and loan crisis did not put an end to
deregulation. In 1999, President Bill Clinton signed the Gramm124
Leach-Bliley Act, which removed the regulatory barriers erected
after the market crash of 1929 that had segregated banking and stock
125
brokering. Within months of this deregulation, a feverish outbreak
of fraudulent mismanagement scandals infected such reputable firms
as CitiCorp, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Solomon Barney, and

119. COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 17, at 2.
120. ROSE, supra note 104, at 64.
121. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 26–27 (2000).
122. Id. at 26.
123. JAMES R. BARTH, SUSANNE TRIMBATH & GLENN YAGO, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN
CRISIS: LESSONS FROM A REGULATORY FAILURE, at xi (2004).
124. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
125. ROSE, supra note 104, at 210.
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126
Credit Suisse. Some have argued that the spectacular failures of
Enron and WorldCom, among others, can be traced directly back to
the deregulation of 1999.127 Whether or not that is the case, a
substantial historical record documents the negative economic fallout
from periods of significant deregulation.
What relevant principles can be drawn from this history?
Although historical attitudes and events are unlikely to serve as
dispositive indicators of how well the U.S. legal system would
accommodate a more principles-based approach to corporate
governance, they provide several important guideposts for
comparison. First, Americans’ longstanding apprehension of
corporate abuses, which has persisted since the earliest days of the
colonial era, suggests that rules are preferable to principles in
128
American corporate governance. Rules serve as external legal
safeguards—as intermediaries at the gates of the market to prevent
129
corporate abuses —and therefore function to assuage individual
anxieties about prospective abuses. Conversely, soft law principles
rely on corporate self-regulation. This trust in corporations to govern
themselves is anathema to U.S. historical attitudes and experiences
that persist into the twenty-first century:130 nearly three of every four
Americans reported in 2002 that “business has too much power over
131
too many aspects of American life.”
Additionally, history has shown that U.S. legislators have
consistently responded to manifestations of corporate fraud and
failure with heavy-handed rules and regulation. Such was true at the
beginning of the twentieth century after the Reading Railroad
132
collapse and resultant banking collapses, after the market crash of
133
1929, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century after the

126. Id. at 210–11.
127. Id. at 211.
128. Id. at 9.
129. 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 98, at 22.
130. See GEORGE HORACE GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2002, at 33
(2003) (noting that a Gallup review of Americans’ attitudes toward corporations revealed that
“the public has historically held lukewarm feelings toward big business” and a substantial “48%
say corporations can be trusted ‘only a little’ or ‘not at all’”).
131. OTTO LERBINGER, CORPORATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS: INTERACTING WITH INTEREST
GROUPS, MEDIA, AND GOVERNMENT 352 (2006) (reporting the results of a July 2002 survey).
132. Niedringhaus, supra note 113, at 19.
133. ROSE, supra note 104, at 209.
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134
Enron and WorldCom collapses. Therefore, even if a soft law
principles-based regime were adopted into U.S. law, it seems highly
probable that were another large-scale corporate scandal to emerge
and rekindle the frantic flames of anxiety in a spooked American
populace, the legislative response would be aggressively regulatory
and unequivocally rules based. Thus, even if some legislative attempt
were made to institute a soft law corporate governance regime into
U.S. law, its longevity would appear dubious at best.
Moreover, soft law has blossomed in the United Kingdom under
completely different circumstances than those that exist in the United
States. As one observer has noted, in Europe, “the very idea of soft
law mechanisms as alternatives or complements to traditional hard
law arose a decade ago from the acknowledgement that European
integration had created a fundamental asymmetry between policies
promoting market efficiency and policies aimed at social
protection.”135 During the genesis of the European Union, soft law
was championed as an effective way of unifying divergent national
136
perspectives and political systems. In the United States, where the
political system is symmetrical, soft law would offer no such benefit.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom emerged as a soft law pioneer
during the early period of European Union formation. In 1992, the
Bank of England and the London Stock Exchange instituted the first
corporate governance code of the modern era, which was developed
under the supervision of U.K. corporate luminary Sir Adrian
137
Cadbury. In effect it was business, not government, that was
138
regulating business.
Therefore, while the Combined Code traces its history to this
pivotal time in U.K. and European legal and political history, no
analogue exists in the modern U.S. experience. The United States has
never allowed corporate luminaries like Sir Cadbury to form and

134. See David S. Hilzenrath, Accounting Bill Advances; Senate Panel Backs Broad Measure
with GOP Help, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at E1.
135. Robilant, supra note 32, at 505.
136. Id. at 501–02.
137. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 297 (3d ed. 2004).
The committee that drafted the code is known as the “Cadbury Committee,” and several
additional governance committees, each chaired by United Kingdom corporate leaders, have
met to draft and revise governance codes. Id. at 297–98.
138. See ACCOUNTING ETHICS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS AND
MANAGEMENT, 184 (J. Edward Ketz ed., 2006) (interpreting the Cadbury norms to mean that
business in the United Kingdom is “largely of a self-regulatory nature”).
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reform its law. Congressional committees may seek advice and insight
from such luminaries, but ultimately the rules and regulations come
from government, principally state governments, and not from chief
139
executive officers and boards of directors. Because this pattern is so
well established in U.S. law, and because U.S. shareholders and
investors are undoubtedly still smarting from the billions of dollars
lost in corporate abuses since the turn of the century, a soft law
approach that places code-fashioning authority in the hands of
corporate luminaries would very likely meet insurmountable public
opposition.
B. Cultural Influences
Just as American history has played a dominant role in shaping
and preserving U.S. rules-based regulation of business, deep-seated
and uniquely American cultural values have likewise had a significant
effect. In particular, the interplay of two American values makes the
wholesale adoption of a principles-based code almost un-American.
These values are (1) a fervent belief that corporations are capable of
moral or immoral action, and (2) an impassioned desire to uphold
justice, including harsh retributivist justice, as a means of securing
rightness and fairness.
Behavioral and sociological research has shown that Americans
140
Although
believe corporations are capable of immoral acts.
Americans generally support business, they have a strong, distinctly
negative reaction to corporate misbehavior.141 Public opinion surveys
witness that Americans view corporate collapse as a byproduct of
“executives’ greed for money and power and an overall, societal
weakening of personal values.”142 At the time Enron and WorldCom
were imploding, a majority of Americans spoke of the crumbling
corporate culture in moral terms, believing that former President Bill

139. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address to the 2007 USEU Corporate Governance Conference (Oct. 9, 2007) (transcript on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“In America, our system of federal regulation has been built upon a foundation of
laws and rules established by 50 state governments as well as U.S. territories and their
respective courts of law.”).
140. See Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual
Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 152 (1989) (citing research showing that the public
viewed corporate crime as widespread and deserving of punishment).
141. Id. at 152, 162.
142. Diane Stafford, We May Be Closer Than We Think, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 11, 2004, at
C1.
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Clinton was “at least partially responsible [for the scandals] because
143
of the climate he set in office with his moral failings.” Importantly,
empirical studies also show that even when corporate and individual
misdeeds are identical, Americans hold corporations to a higher
standard, judge them to be more reckless and more morally wrong in
their behaviors, and wish to see them punished more severely.144
This strong negative response to corporations may be partly
explained by Americans’ perception of corporations as independent
actors, capable of making moral choices but possessing more money
and power than an everyday individual. In 1790, James Wilson, an
early U.S. statesman and signatory of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, declared that corporations are
“moral persons” though “not in a state of natural liberty, because
their actions are cognizable by the superior power of the state.”145
Several years later, the Supreme Court of the United States echoed
similar sentiments in the pivotal case Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward.146 The Court opined, “A corporation is an artificial
being . . . [which] possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it . . . . Among the most important [of these
is] . . . individuality . . . .”147 Thus, a belief that corporations are
persons, capable of moral and immoral acts, has been preached by
important legal and political leaders in formative eras of U.S. history.
Other sources offer further evidence of this uniquely American
value. Authorities in business and industry have also attributed
personhood and morality to the corporation. Indeed, the notion that
the “corporation [is] a moral agent and [a] fit subject for
148
punishment” pervades American “textbooks and syllabi of courses
in business management . . . marketing, and public policy . . . [and]
controls the thinking in the majority of many business ethics
centers.”149 Business expositor John David Rose observes in
unmistakably moral terms that “the Ten Commandments could be

143. David W. Moore, Little Political Fallout from Business Scandals, GALLUP NEWS
SERVICE, July 8, 2002, http://www.gallup.com/poll/6340/Little-Political-Fallout-From-BusinessScandals.aspx?version=print.
144. Hans & Ermann, supra note 140, at 162.
145. 2 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA, GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN LIFE 173 (1968).
146. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
147. Id. at 636.
148. Donna Card Charron, Stockholders and Stakeholders: The Battle for Control of the
Corporation, 27 CATO J. 1, 9 (2007).
149. Id. at 1.
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considered the final word of what is right and wrong in business as in
150
life.” American CEO Charles Fulweiler describes the abusive way
corporations have treated the American public thus: “It is a neverending source of amazement to me that we are cheated, lied to,
murdered and, in general, treated like mindless supplicants . . . .”151
Contrast Fulweiler’s words with these words of the profoundly
influential English jurist Sir Edward Coke: corporations “cannot
commit treason nor be outlawed, or excommunicated, for they have
152
no souls.” Other eminent English jurists and state executives have
agreed.153 Perhaps Fulweiler’s strong diction and the words of the
American judges, statesmen, and business leaders cited in this Section
are thus evidence not only of a fervent cultural belief that
corporations are akin to individuals and capable of immoral acts, but
also of a purely American phenomenon that was not inherited from
Britain.
Indeed, more than any other nation, the United States relies on
lawyers, legal threats, and courts of justice to implement public
154
policies and to resolve business disputes. The range of matters that
can be resolved in U.S. courts is “broader than in other nations and
155
growing each year.” American culture has also long been imbued
with a strong sense that punishment must be exacted in the U.S.
courts,156 which are plaintiff-friendly by design157 and offer a breadth

150.
151.
152.

ROSE, supra note 104, at 71.
Id. at 2.
PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, ONE WITH NINEVEH: POLITICS,
CONSUMPTION, AND THE HUMAN FUTURE 295 (2004).
153. Roger Manwood, Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer under appointment from Queen
Elizabeth I, opined that corporations “were invisible, immortal, and . . . had no soul, and
therefore no subpoena lieth against them, because they have no conscience . . . .” FRANKLIN
FISKE HEARD, CURIOSITIES OF THE LAW REPORTERS 79 (1871) (quoting from a description of
Manwood’s opinion in an English Law Reporter). Edward, First Baron Thurlow, attorney and
Lord Chancellor of Great Britain under four prime ministers in the eighteenth century, argued
that “[c]orporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned . . . .”
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 550 (1979). Thurlow also famously said, “Did you ever
expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be
kicked?” MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 1 (1977).
154. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3–4 (2002); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL
LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001).
155. BURKE, supra note 154, at 3.
156. See id. (“[S]ome studies suggest that those supposedly stoic pioneers of frontier
America were far more inclined to sue than their allegedly litigation-loving descendants.”).
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of procedural advantages unmatched in the courts of many other
nations because they include civil juries, broad discovery privileges,
broader access to courts and lawyers, contingent fee arrangements,
158
and the absence of “loser-pays” cost-shifting rules. American legal
culture is likewise rich in constitutional, statutory, and common law
jurisprudence that generates an abundance of personal rights and
159
facilitates the litigation necessary to protect them. Perhaps this
explains why approximately 92 million lawsuits are filed each year in
the United States.160 Nearly 70,000 of these are liability suits,
whereas—for the sake of comparison—only 200 liability suits are filed
161
annually in the United Kingdom.
The U.S. legal culture, however, is not merely preoccupied with
providing plaintiffs access to the courts. It is also deeply concerned
with the aggressive punishment of convicted wrongdoers. As Marie
Gottschalk explains, “[T]he United States . . . has built a carceral state
that is unprecedented among Western countries[,] . . . distinguish[ed]
[by] the sheer size of its prison and jail population; its reliance on
harsh, degrading sanctions; and the persistence and centrality of the
162
death penalty.” The proportion of adults behind bars is higher in
the United States than in any other nation of the world.163 And as
James Whitman notes, relative to the legal systems of Europe,
“America’s legal system is harsher . . . in all respects [because]
157. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION 16 (2004) (noting the many “unique causes of action available in [the United
States], as well as the distinctive plaintiff-friendly nature of the US legal system”).
158. Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in
International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 501, 502 (1993).
159. Rogers M. Smith, Rights, in A COMPANION TO AMERICAN THOUGHT 595, 595–98
(Richard Wrightman Fox & James T. Kloppenberg eds., 1995) (observing that the United States
began as the culmination of claims for British recognition of individual and collective American
rights, that Americans have made many rights claims through much of U.S. history, and that
American courts and legislatures continue to play an essential role in securing those rights).
160. DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 411
(2004).
161. PETER W. HUBER & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 47 (1991).
162. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006). Gottschalk continues: “Nearly one in fifty people in the
United States, excluding children and the elderly, is behind bars today.” Id. Gottschalk argues
that America’s punitive penal policy is the product of several forces, including uniquely
American historical events. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 1. The incarceration rate in the United States has increased more than five-fold
since 1973. Id.
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America criminalizes a wider variety of conduct than Europe
does[,] . . . subjects more classes of people to potential criminal
liability[,] . . . [and] the punishments it imposes are far less flexible
164
and less individualized . . . .” Additionally, American laws are more
detailed, complex, and prescriptive than those of many countries, and
U.S. legal penalties are often more severe.165 The rate of incarceration
in the United States is the highest in the industrialized world, and
public opinion polls indicate that Americans are becoming
increasingly likely to support punitive measures like “three strikes”
166
sentencing laws. Relative to the laws of many other nations, U.S.
law has trended toward ever-increasing harshness in its criminal
policies.167
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,168 Justice John Paul Stevens
opined on “the stark reality that the United States is the only country
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty.”169 Although the Supreme Court went on to hold that
the execution of individuals who were under the age of eighteen when
170
they committed capital crimes is unconstitutional, the U.S. legal
culture continues to be infused with retributivist justifications for
criminal punishment.171
Less severe forms of punishment than the death penalty likewise
characterize a brand of retribution that is unmistakably American. It
has been estimated that the amount of taxpayer dollars paid in tort
punitive damages is 2.5 percent of the gross national product in the

164. Daniel Statman, The Historical and Cultural Roots of Harsh Punishment, 17 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 299, 299–300 (2005) (reviewing JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003)).
165. KAGAN, supra note 154, at 3.
166. Id.
167. WHITMAN, supra note 164, at 3.
168. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
169. Id. at 575.
170. Id. at 574.
171. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1984) (noting retributivism is the
“primary justification for the death penalty”); Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed:
Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 117 (2000) (attributing the
decline of probation and parole in the American justice system to retributivism); Robert J.
Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End of
the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507–08 (1997) (book review) (“[S]ince the midseventies retribution has come back with a vengeance, enjoying today a greater prominence in
public discourse over crime and punishment than at any other time in post-war America.”).
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United States, compared to 0.5 percent in the United Kingdom.
Additionally, although “three-strikes” laws, mandatory minimum
sentences, and “truth in sentencing” laws are often criticized for being
excessively punitive, U.S. lawmakers have been undeterred from
making them available to courts across the United States.173
In light of these distinctively American notions of rights,
adequate due process in the courts, and retributive punishment, a soft
law system built solely on principles and “best practices” appears
completely incompatible with American legal culture. Under a
principles-based regime like the Combined Code, shareholders may
only punish the corporation by moving their assets elsewhere. But if
the corporation is viewed through the lens of American culture as an
immoral “person” that has committed fraud or gross negligence
leading to significant losses in shareholder investments, then the
corporation must be punished directly. Once a shareholder’s funds
are lost, punitive justice will not be served by transferring the
remainder of that shareholder’s shares elsewhere. Hence, without
rules, without hard law that prohibits transgression and justifies its
reprimand, no punishment that satisfies the American cultural sense
of retributivist justice can be meted out. Principles-based regulation is
therefore anathema to deeply seated and quintessentially American
notions of retributivist punishment for immoral acts.
CONCLUSION
American financial and political leaders have assessed the
feasibility of overhauling the U.S. regulatory framework of corporate
governance by adopting a more principles-based approach. Many of
these leaders believe this overhaul would create something similar to
and perhaps patterned after the United Kingdom’s Combined Code.
This Note has argued that this aspiration is fundamentally flawed and
patently impractical. America’s longstanding, firmly fixed fear of
corporate excesses, combined with its strong cultural disdain for
corporate misbehavior and its espousal of just deserts punishment,
make it highly unlikely the American public and their representatives
in Congress would ever replace legislative rules with “best practices”

172. Punitive Damages: Tort Reform & FDA Defense: Hearing on S. 671 and S. 672 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 112 (1995) (statement of Theodore Olson).
173. HENRY M. WROBLESKI & KAREN M. HESS, INTRODUCTION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 467 (8th ed. 2006).
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principles. Moreover, even if principles were to find a foothold in
U.S. corporate regulation, the consistent history of aggressive
congressional responses to corporate misdeeds and collapses suggests
that once the first corporate crisis surfaced, Congress would eradicate
those principles with aggressive and prophylactic rules-based
regulation.

